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I. Introduction 
This paper intends to clarify the effects of strategic interaction among the manufacturers on 
the advantages of resale price maintenance (RPM) in a market with demand uncertainty. 
Particularly, it focuses on the impact of RPM on the manufacturers’ profits, consumer surplus, 
and social welfare. In the model, the oligopolistic manufacturers sell their products to the 
consumers through competitive retailers in a marketplace where the number of consumers in the 
market is a random variable. This paper considers the games without and with resale price 
maintenance and then observes the difference brought by RPM. The games defined in this paper 
significantly differ from those in previous works by modeling the strategic interaction between 
the manufacturers. 
RPM has been a contentious topic in the industrial organization literature for decades. 
Different theories have been developed to address this behavior of manufacturing firms. One line 
of justifications is the free riding theories represented by Telser [1960]. The free riding theories 
assume that the demand for a manufacturer’s product depends on some informational services 
provided by the retailers. RPM enables the retailers to capture the demand generated by the 
services and thus provides incentive for them to invest in those services. RPM then improves 
social efficiency by enhancing demand. However, new theory is needed to justify the use of RPM 
for the products that do not need extensive sale services. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck [1996, 
1997] explain the RPM use from another standpoint. They find that a manufacturer  facing 
uncertain demand has an incentive to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the 
emergence of discount retailers. They analyze a model with a monopoly manufacturer selling to 
competitive retailers in a market where the demand is uncertain. They find that with RPM, the 
monopoly manufacturer has higher wholesale demand and makes more profits.  
The results reported by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck are impressive. However, the results are 
based on the analysis of a model with a monopoly manufacturer, which is restrictive. In the real 
life, RPM or its equivalent programs are more frequently observed in markets with inter-
manufacturer competition. It is unclear whether the incentive that works in a monopoly still   3
works in an oligopoly. Thus some issues (especially some anti-trust issues) cannot be addressed 
satisfactorily without a theory capable of extending those results on RPM to markets where the 
manufacturers have to compete with each other. 
The competition among the manufacturers adds another layer of complication to the model 
considered by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck [1996]. In a monopoly, the retailers’ behaviors are 
simply determined by the manufacturer’s wholesale price. But in an oligopoly, the manufacturers 
have to anticipate the strategic i nteraction among the retailers before choosing their own 
strategies. However, if the demand is uncertain, as the price dispersion found in a monopoly 
(Prescott [1975], Bryant [1980], Eden [1990]), this paper finds that in an oligopoly, the entire set 
of retail prices of each manufacturer’s product is still solely determined by that manufacturer’s 
wholesale price, which makes the model tractable. However, the retail inventories are now 
determined by both manufacturers’ wholesale prices. This paper also finds that RPM encourages 
the retailers to stock greater inventories, even when the manufacturers have to compete with one 
another. The manufacturers thus enhance the retailers' expected sale and make more profits. 
Under the assumption that the demand is either high or low, the game without RPM can result in 
two types of symmetric equilibria: low wholesale price equilibrium and high wholesale price 
equilibrium. And it is possible for the game to have the two types of equilibria simultaneously. In 
this case, high wholesale price equilibrium represents a high level of coordination between the 
manufacturers. It results in high profits for the manufacturers but low consumer surplus. On the 
contrary, the low wholesale price equilibrium represents a coordination failure. However, if RPM 
is allowed, the possibility of coordination failure is ruled out. Our model makes it easy to discuss 
welfare issues since the consumers have unit demand, though there is product differentiation in 
the model. RPM can enhance the social welfare by encouraging the retailers to stock greater 
inventories and thus facilitating greater expected sales to the consumers. RPM can also transfer 
some benefits from the consumers to the manufacturers, because the average retail prices are not 
lower under RPM. The consumers as a whole can be better off if significantly more consumers 
are served under RPM. Otherwise they are worse off with RPM. The advantages of RPM found   4
by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck [1996] in markets with demand uncertainty are well preserved 
even if the strategic interaction between the manufacturers is taken into consideration.  
This paper will advance as follows. Section II depicts the model and the definitions of the 
games. Sections III and IV analyze and solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the 
games. The welfare issues are addressed in section V. Section VI discusses an example about the 
recent use of Minimum Advertised Price (MAP) programs in prerecorded music market. Some 
summary remarks are given in section VII. The Appendix provides the proofs of the three 
propositions in Section III. 
 
II.  The Model 
The market and the games 
This is a symmetric model with duopoly manufacturers and competitive retailers. The two 
manufacturers are denoted by 0 and 1. They produce horizontally differentiated, non-storable 
products. The manufacturers have identical cost functions, which are assumed to be zero
1. The 
feasible specifications of the goods are normalized to interval [0,1]. Assume the specification of 
manufacturer 0’s product is 0 and that of manufacturer 1’s product is 1. 
The consumers have unit demand. It is common knowledge that the consumers’ most 
preferred specifications are evenly distributed along [0, 1]. But each particular consumer’s taste is 
private information. If a consumer’s most preferred specification is  x, the consumer’s utility 
from consuming manufacturer 0’s product is  tx - 1 and the utility from consuming manufacturer 
1’s product is  ) 1 ( 1 x t - - . Parameter t represents the degree of product differentiation.  
The market demand is uncertain. The measure of active consumers q is a random variable 
and  i i i prob a a q q - = = +1 } { , for  } ,..., 2 , 1 { n i˛ , where  1 ... 0 2 1 = < < < £ n q q q  and 
                                                 
1 The results of this paper remain valid with positive marginal costs c>0.   5
1 ... 0 1 2 1 = < < < < = + n n a a a a . We can define demand pocket i as the portion of demand that 
would show up in the market if and only if  i q q ‡ .
2 Therefore we have  n demand pockets 
denoted as  n ,..., 2 , 1 . The measure of demand pocket  i is  1 - - i i q q  (let  0 0 = q ). The demand 
pocket  i’s probability of entering the market is  i a - 1  because  i i prob a q q - = ‡ 1 } { . The 
consumers’ probabilities of entering the market are independent to the consumers’ preferences. 
The retail market is perfectly competitive. The retailers have zero dealing costs. Unsold retail 
inventories cannot be returned to the manufacturers. Without loss of generality, we adopt the 
convention that every retailer carries only one manufacturer’s product and charges a single price.
3 
From the paper by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck [1996], each manufacturer should always 
prefer to use RPM, given the other manufacturer’s strategy. Thus this paper only defines two 
games depending on whether RPM is allowed: the niche competition game and the RPM game.
4 
 
The niche competition game: First, the two manufacturers simultaneously announce their 
wholesale prices. Second, the retailers order inventories from the manufacturers and decide the 
retail prices. Third, the demand uncertainty resolves and the consumers come to the market. The 
                                                 
2 If  i q q ‡ , the consumers in the market can be represented by interval [0,  i q ]. If  i q q < , the 
consumers NOT in the market can be represented by interval [ 1 - i q , 1]. Therefore the consumers 
in the market if and only if  i q q ‡  is [ 1 - i q , i q ], whose measure is  1 - - i i q q . 
3 As long as the retailers are perfectly competitive, every single unit of retail inventory with a 
price tag on it should yield zero expected profit for the retailer who carries that unit. Assuming a 
retailer can carry both manufacturers’ products and charge multiple prices would not affect the 
price-inventory configuration in equilibrium. Therefore it would not change any result of this 
paper except requiring more notations. 
4 The rationing rule employed in the games is first-come-first-served.   6
consumers enter the market sequentially in random order. Each active consumer chooses a 
retailer to purchase such that his/her utility is maximized. 
The RPM game: First, the two manufacturers simultaneously announce their wholesale 
prices and retail prices. Second, the retailers order inventories from the manufacturers. Third, 
the demand uncertainty resolves and the consumers come to the market. The consumers enter the 
market sequentially in random order. Each active consumer chooses a retailer to purchase such 
that his/her utility is maximized. Since a unique price is charged for each manufacturer’s 
product, I assume the ratios of sale to inventory are identical for all retailers selling the same 
product.  
 
A note on the model with certain demand 
As a benchmark, consider the price competition game played by two vertically i ntegrated 
manufacturers, where the market demand is certain. Suppose there is a continuum of consumers 
with measure of 1. Denote the prices as  0 p  and  1 p . Let  1 0 £ p  and  1 1 £ p  since the consumers’ 
reservation prices are not greater than 1. There are three possible types of symmetric equilibria 
for this game, depending on the degree to which the manufacturers’ products are differentiated. 
1. Typical Oligopoly: If 
3
2




0  (See Tirole [1988] for 
details). In this equilibrium, the manufacturers compete at the margin and all active consumers 
receive positive consumer surplus. A result that can apply to all games defined in this paper is 
 
Lemma 2.1 If the retail prices 0 p  and  1 p satisfy | 1 0 p p - | t £ , then all consumers are served 
by the manufacturers if and only if  t p p - £ + 2 1 0 . 
 
Proof: The consumer that is least likely to purchase the product is the “marginal consumer” 
who is indifferent between purchasing from either manufacturer. Denoting the marginal   7









x . But  1 0 £ £ x  if and only if | 1 0 p p - | t £ . The marginal consumer would 










, which is equivalent to 
t p p - £ + 2 1 0 .  Q.E.D. 
 
2. Restricted oligopoly: If  1
3
2








p p - = = .  In this case 
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p - < , the 
manufacturers compete at the margin since  t p p - < + 2 1 0  (Lemma 2.1). Thus the demand 














p - > , the manufacturers do not compete with each 







= . Both 




-  in equilibrium when  1
3
2
£ < t , and the marginal consumer 
receives zero surplus. 





0 = = p p . The market is segmented into 
two monopoly markets.  
   8
III. The Niche Competition Game 
In t his section we will find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the niche competition 
game. We solve the retailers’ subgame first, then solve the manufacturers’ problems. In order to 
focus on the oligopoly situations, we assume 
3
2
0 < £t  from now on. 
The retailers’ subgame  
In the niche competition game, the wholesale prices, denoted as  0 w  and  1 w , are exogenous to 
the retailers. Lemma 3.1 characterizes the equilibrium of the retailers’ subgame. An important 
characteristic of the equilibrium configuration of the niche competition game derived from 
Lemma 3.1 is presented in Proposition 3.2. 
 
Lemma 3.1 In the niche competition game, the retailers’ subgame has a unique equilibrium 
configuration of prices and quantities. In that equilibrium configuration, there is a group of 









1 , and stock the pre-sale total inventories (denoted as 
i I0  and 
i I1) that 
are exactly enough to serve demand pocket i at those retail prices.
 5 
 
                                                 
5 Inventories 
i I0  and 
i I1 can be uniquely determined given  0 w  and  1 w . But explicitly specifying 
them is very complex for arbitrary 0 w  and  1 w . Essentially, we find the measure of consumers in 
demand pocket 1 who can to purchase from each manufacturer at prices  0 w  and  1 w . Next, we 
find the measure of consumers in demand pockets 1 and 2 who are not able to purchase at prices 
0 w  and  1 w , but wish to purchase at prices  ) 1 /( 1 0 a - w  and  ) 1 /( 1 1 a - w . Iterating this 
procedure yields 
i I0  and 
i I1. We omit the details.   9
Proof: According to the rules of the game and the price configuration depicted in the lemma, 








1  can sell their 
inventories with probability of  i a - 1  (when  i q q ‡ ). So they earn zero profits. This price 
configuration is an equilibrium because any deviation by any single retailer would not be 
profitable: raising its price leads to a loss because of lower probability of selling; lowering its 
price also leads to a loss because of less revenue from sale. 
Now we show that any departure from the configuration stated in the lemma cannot be an 
equilibrium. First, apparently no retailer would charge retail price lower than the wholesale price 
0 w  (or  1 w ) in equilibrium. Second, if the retail inventory at  0 w  (or  1 w ) is not 
1
0 I  (or 
1
1 I ), the 
configuration cannot be an equilibrium because: if the total retail inventory at  0 w  (or  1 w ) is 
greater than 
1
0 I  (or 
1
1 I ), the retailers cannot break even because its probability of selling is less 
than  1 1 1 = -a ; if the total  retail inventory at  0 w  (or  1 w ) is less than 
1
0 I  (or 
1
1 I ), the residual 
demand can be profitably served by a retailer charging  e + 0 w  (for small e). Third, any retailer 





















break even, because they can only sell their inventories with probability of  2 1 a -  (note that 
demand pocket 1 is served by retailers charging  0 w  and  1 w ). Iterating the reasoning of the 








1 ) is not 
i I0  (or 





0  and 
1
0
1 + - i
w
a




1  and 
1
1
1 + - i
w
a
) cannot break even. Thus 
the configuration stated in the lemma is the unique equilibrium configuration of the retailers’ 
subgame.  Q.E.D.   10
 
Proposition 3.2 In the niche competition game, the retail prices of a manufacturer's product 
only depend on the wholesale price of that manufacturer.  
 
Lemma 3.1 says that the price that a competitive retailer charges depends on the probability 
of selling. For instance, if a retailer expects its inventory to be sold with probability of 0.5, then 
this retailer would charge retail price that is twice as much as the wholesale price in order to 
break even. Introducing the competition by manufacturers into the model complicates the 
retailers’ subgame because the retailers now face inter-brand competition as well as intra-brand 
competition. Proposition 3.2 points out that the whole set of retail prices of a manufacturer’s 
product is still solely determined by the manufacturer’s wholesale price, but not affected by its 
rival’s behavior. In other words, the retail prices in this oligopoly game are still determined by the 
intra-brand competition in the same way as that in a monopoly. However, the retailers’ pre-sale 
inventories are now determined by b oth manufacturers’ wholesale prices. The inter-brand 
competition only influences the retailers’ inventory decisions, but not their pricing decisions. This 
proposition also makes the manufacturers’ problem tractable. 
The manufacturers’ problem 
Each manufacturer, anticipating the ensuing retailer’s subgame, chooses its optimal reacting 
wholesale price  0 w  or  1 w  to maximize its profit. The manufacturers’ profits are simply their 
wholesale revenues since the production is costless. Unfortunately, even with the relief brought 
by Proposition 3.2, solving the manufacturers’ problem in a general model is still exceptionally 
difficult because too many situations could arise. We will consider a simplified model where the 
demand is either low or high. The measure of active consumers is  5 . 0  in the low demand and 1 
in the high demand. Assume  q prob = = ) 5 . 0 (q  and  q prob - = = 1 ) 1 (q . Hence we have two 
demand pockets, denoted by 1 and 2. Each demand pocket has the size of 0.5. Demand pocket 1 
enters the market with probability of 1 and pocket 2 enters with probability of  q - 1 .    11
We only consider the symmetric equilibria in order to compare them to the equilibrium of the 
RPM game, which is always symmetric. The following strategy is used to locate the equilibria of 
the niche competition game. First, assume the symmetric equilibrium wholesale prices are in a 
certain interval so that the manufacturers’ profit functions can be identified. Second, solve for the 
corresponding candidate equilibrium prices. At last, characterize the necessary and sufficient 
conditions under which the manufacturers cannot profitably deviate from the candidate 
equilibrium prices. There are many potential types of equilibrium. In particular, for each niche, 
competition can be characterized as “typical oligopoly” where the marginal consumer of the 
demand pocket receives surplus; “restricted oligopoly” where the marginal consumer receives no 
surplus yet the demand pocket is fully served; “monopoly” where the demand pocket is partially 
served; and the case in which the demand pocket is not served at all. However, it turns out that 
only three types of equilibria can actually occur, as shown by the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3.3 In the niche competition game, the equilibrium can only take three types:  
Type I.  )) 1 )(
2






w w - - ˛ . 








w w - - = = . 
Type III.  )
2






q w w - - ˛ ,    (when   q t 2 < ).  
 
Proof. (See the Appendix) 
 
The proof of Lemma 3.3 is put in the Appendix. Types I, II and III equilibria are 
characterized in the following Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. In type I equilibrium, the 















(Lemma 2.1) and all active consumers receive positive surplus. In type II equilibrium, both   12
demand pockets are fully served but the competition between the manufacturers is limited in 
demand pocket 2. In  type III equilibrium, demand pocket 1 is fully served, but pocket 2 is not 
served at all. The proofs of the following propositions are put in the Appendix. 
 












0                                                  (3.1) 
are a Nash equilibrium of the  game if and only if 
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0 p p .                                                 (3.2) 
 
Proof. (See the Appendix) 
 
Conditions (a) and (b) show that it is likely for all active consumers to be served if parameters 
t and  q are relatively small. A small  t implies low degree of product differentiation, which 
means that a manufacturer can easily attract more customers by lowering its price. A small  q 
implies high likelihood for demand pocket 2 to enter the market, which also induces the 
manufacturers to set relatively low prices in order to make it possible for the demand pocket 2   13
getting served. The gray area in Figure
6 3.1, called area 1, illustrates the set of parameters  ) , ( t q  
satisfying condition (a) or (b). 
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- - = =p p .                                           (3.4) 
 
Proof. (See the Appendix) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the set of parameters  ) , ( t q  that satisfy condition (c), called area 2, and thus 
supports type II equilibrium. 
                                                 
6 The figures in this paper are created in Mathematica 4, Wolfram Research [1999].   14
 
















     
Figure 3.2 
 
Proposition 3.6 In the niche competition game, the prices  




0                                                       (3.5)   
are a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if 





£ £t   and    1
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= =p p .                                                     (3.6) 
 
Proof. (See the Appendix) 
 
Type III equilibrium is likely to occur with relatively great parameter t and  q, which imply 
that the product differentiation is significant and demand pocket 2 is unlikely to enter the market. 
Therefore the manufacturers are likely to give up demand pocket 2 and serve pocket 1 only. Type 
III equilibrium is not Pareto efficient because some consumers are not served though they have   15
positive evaluations on the products and the production is costless. Figure 3.3 shows the set of 
parameters  ) , ( t q  satisfy condition (d) or (e), called area 3, and thus supports type III equilibrium. 
 


















Putting the three areas above into one figure, we have the following Figure 3.4. It is notable 
to see that both areas 1 and 2 overlap with area 3, which implies that it is possible to have 
multiple symmetric equilibria for a niche competition game. For instance: the parameters 
83 . 0 = q  and  4 . 0 = t  satisfy both conditions (a) and (e). By Proposition 3.4 and 3.6, we have 

















0 = =p p . In the case 
of multiple equilibria, the high wholesale price equilibrium represents a high level of coordination 
between the manufacturers and it yields high profits for them. But the high price equilibrium is 
Pareto inefficient since some consumers may not be served. The low wholesale price equilibrium 
represents a coordination failure between the manufacturers. Notice that both situations are 
equilibria, but not temporary collusion or price war. This is an interesting result because it shows 
that in a given marketplace, we could have “cutting-throat” competition among the 
manufacturers, or just moderate competition. Which case would occur depends on the starting 
point of the competition game. The possibility of multiple equilibria in an oligopoly is jointly 
caused by the (wholesale) pricing externality and demand uncertainty. There is also a small area 
in Figure 3.4 representing the set of parameters that cannot support any symmetric equilibrium. It 
could be the case of asymmetric equilibrium (where one manufacturer charges low wholesale   16
price and serve both demand pockets and another manufacturer charges high price and serve 
demand pocket 1 only), or no equilibrium at all. 





















IV. The RPM Game 
The retailers’ subgame  
In the RPM game, the manufacturers specify both the wholesale prices and retail prices. The 
retailers only decide how much inventory to order. The retailers can earn a margin from sale, but 
the competition drives the retailers’ inventories to be higher than their expected sales. Therefore 
they still make zero profits in equilibrium. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium of 
the retailers’ subgame. 
 
Lemma 4.1 In the equilibrium of the retailers’ subgame in the RPM game, the ratio of a 
retailer’s inventory to its expected sale equals the manufacturer’s retail price markup.  
 
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider manufacturer 0 only. Denote:  0 w ￿ wholesale 
price of manufacturer 0,  0 r ￿ retail price of manufacturer 0,  0 d ￿ expected sale of a retailer 
dealing manufacturer 0’s product,  0 i ￿ inventory of the retailer, 
r
0 p ￿ expected profit of the   17
retailer. Since the retail market is competitive and the retailers are risk-neutral, the expected profit 
of the retailer in equilibrium is   0 0 0 0 0 0 = ￿ - ￿ = i w d r









= .  Q.E.D. 
  
The manufacturers’ problem 
The next lemma is about the manufacturers’ profits. It is easy to prove, noting that the 
retailers earn zero profits and there is no production or dealing cost. 
  
Lemma 4.2 Each manufacturer’s profit equals the total expected revenue of its retailers. 
 
The retail prices and inventories determine the retailers’ revenues, and therefore the 
manufacturers’ profits. Thus the manufacturers can maximize their profits by optimally choosing 
their retail prices. Given the retail prices, the manufacturers can stimulate high enough retail 
inventories by choosing low enough wholesale prices (Lemma 4.1). The retailers therefore should 
never stock out in equilibrium. Denote the retail prices of the manufacturers as  0 r  and  1 r . 
According to Lemma 4.2, when 
3
2
< t , the manufacturers’ profits are  
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- - ￿ i i
n
i
i q q a  is the expected measure of active consumers in the market. The 
equilibrium of the RPM game can be characterized by the following proposition. We omit the 
proof because it is essentially the same as that of the vertically intergraded situation. 
   18
Proposition 4.4 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the RPM game. If 
3
2
< t , the 
equilibrium retail prices are  




0 .                                                         (4.3) 
All active consumers are served in this equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium profits of the 
manufacturers are 














q q a p p . 
 
Note that the equilibrium retail prices of the RPM game are the same as that of the niche 
competition game when only demand pocket 1 is served. Therefore if a niche competition game 
had multiple equilibria, the low wholesale  price equilibrium would be precluded by RPM. 
Compared to the high price equilibrium of the niche competition game, RPM allows the 
manufacturers to earn even more profits by allowing more consumers served. Apply Proposition 









= =p p .                                                  (4.4) 
 
V. Welfare Effects  
In this section we study the welfare effects brought by RPM in a market with oligopolistic 
manufacturers and competitive retailers. The analyses are based on the simplified model defined 
in Section III. Consider the effects of RPM on the manufacturers’ profits first. 
 
Proposition 5.1 In the symmetric equilibria of the games, the manufacturers’ profits are 
strictly higher in the RPM game than that in the niche competition game. 
   19
Proof: We have explicitly found the equilibrium profits for both games. The manufacturers’ 





 by (4.4). In the niche 
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> , which is true if condition 














. (3). In type III equilibrium, the manufacturers’ profits 
are 
4









 if and only if  1 < q . Summing up, the 
manufacturers’ profits in symmetric equilibrium are strictly higher in the RPM game. Q.E.D. 
  
By specifying a unique retail price and supporting the margins from sales for the retailers, a 
manufacturer can ensure that all active consumers are charged the same optimal price that can 
maximize its profit, given the pricing of its rival. Proposition 5.1 shows that in equilibrium, the 
strategic i nteraction under RPM results in higher profits for both manufacturers. Therefore the 
competition by the manufacturers does not take away the advantage of RPM on the 
manufacturers’ profits.  
Our next proposition is on the total inventory of the retailers. R ecall that in the niche 
competition game, we may have an equilibrium that only demand pocket 1 is served and no retail 
inventory is ordered for demand pocket 2. But in the RPM game, the retailers always have 
enough inventories to serve all active consumers. We thus immediately have 
   20
Proposition 5.2 In the symmetric equilibria of the games, the total inventory of all retailers 
in the RPM game is as high as, or strictly higher than that in the niche competition game. 
 
Now consider the social welfare resulting from the two games. Since the production is 
costless, the social welfare from this market (includes the expected consumer surplus and the 
producer surplus) equals the expected consumer benefits from the consumption, which can be 
measured by the expected consumption quantity.
7 We have shown that the expected consumption 
quantity in the RPM game is not lower than that in the niche competition game: If only demand 
pocket 1 is served in the niche competition game, the expected consumption quantity is strictly 
higher in the RPM game. Otherwise they are the same in both games. We therefore have 
 
Proposition 5.3 In the symmetric equilibria of the games, the social welfare in the RPM 
game is as high as, or strictly higher than that in the niche competition game. 
  
Proposition 5.3 is logically related with Proposition 5.2, because the consumption quantity 
depends on the retail inventories. RPM can improve the social welfare because it encourages the 
retailers to stock greater inventory and thus facilitates greater expected sale to the consumers. At 
last we observe the consumer surplus, which is the benefit from consumption net of the 
consumers’ payments, or equivalently, the social welfare net of the manufacturers’ profits. 
 
Proposition 5.4 In the symmetric equilibria of the games, if both demand pockets are served 
in the niche competition game, the consumer surplus is higher in the niche competition game; If 
                                                 
7 For each unit of the product consumed, assuming each manufacturer supply half unit, it can be 




- . Also notice a demand pocket is 
either served in full or not served at all in the equilibrium of the niche competition game.   21
only demand pocket 1 is served in the niche competition game, the consumer surplus is higher in 
the RPM game. 
 
Proof: Denote p as the total profit of the manufacturers, t as the consumer surplus, and w 
as the social welfare. Then  t p w + = , or  p w t - = . (1). If both demand pockets are served in 
the niche competition game, the social welfare w is identical in both games. But the total profit 
of the manufacturers  p is lower in the niche competition game (Proposition 5.1). So the 
consumer surplus t is higher in the niche competition game. (2). If only demand pocket 1 is 
served in the niche competition game, the equilibrium retail prices are the same in both games, 
which are  t. So the consumer surplus of demand pocket 1 is the same for both games. But the 
consumer surplus of demand pocket 2 is positive in the RPM game while is zero in the niche 
competition game. So the consumer surplus t is higher in the RPM game.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 5.4 shows that RPM favors the manufacturers more than the consumers. The gain 
of the manufacturers comes not only from the efficiency gain brought by RPM, but also from the 
consumer surplus. If RPM encourages greater wholesale demand from the retailers, the efficiency 
gain can make not only the manufacturers but also the consumers better off. Otherwise, the 
manufacturers can still earn more profits, but the consumers are liable to be worse off. 
 
VI. Application: Prerecorded Music Market in the United States  
The Minimum Advertised Price (MAP)
 programs
8 of the major distributors of prerecorded 
music in the United States provide an illustration of RPM use in an oligopoly. In the United 
States, five distributors, Sony Music Distribution, Universal Music & Video Distribution, BMG 
                                                 
8 The FTC file No. 971 0070 “Five Consent Agreements Concerning the Market for Prerecorded 
Music in the United States.” (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/index.htm).    22
Distribution, Warner-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation and EMI Music Distribution account for 
approximately 85% of the industry’s $13.7 billion sales. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
recently (May 2000) found that the MAP programs adopted by these five companies violated 
Section V of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Those companies adopted much stricter MAP 
programs between late 1995 and 1996. The programs prevent the retailers from advertising prices 
below the distributors’ minimum advertised prices by denying the cooperative advertising funds 
to any retailer that promotes discounted prices, even in advertisements funded solely by the 
retailers. The advertisements are broadly defined and include even in-store displays. The penalty 
to violating the MAP provisions is serious: failure to stick to the provisions for any particular 
music title would subject the retailer to a suspension of all cooperative advertising funding 
offered by the distributor for about 60 to 90 days. This ensures that even the most aggressive 
retailer would stop advertising prices below the MAP, which makes the MAP programs 
essentially equivalent to RPM.  
1. As the FTC found, the sale of music CDs does not require extensive sale services. Thus the 
“free rider” theory cannot explain the use of MAP in this market very well. 
2. Each of the major distributors has substantial market power. Their copyrighted products 
are well differentiated from each other. Thus this is a typical oligopoly market with horizontal 
product differentiations.  
3. Potential music retailers do not face significant entry barriers. It is reasonable to treat the 
retail market as perfectly competitive.  
4. Though music CDs are physically storable, its market value cannot be regarded as 
perfectly storable because most music titles are fashion goods. Most people’s valuations on those 
music titles are significantly lower after the enthusiasm fades.
  
5. The consumers can readily be modeled as having unit demand.    23
6. The demand is uncertain: It is difficult to predict the demand toward a certain music title.
9 
Also notice that as footnote 3 states, our model applies perfectly even if every music retailer 
carries all distributors’ products, as long as the retail market is perfectly competitive. The FTC 
argues that the distributors can preclude retail price competition through the stricter MAP 
programs and thus eventually increase their own wholesale prices. This is intuitive not necessarily 
true according to this paper. Our model shows that if all demand pockets are served in the niche 
competition game, it is true that the wholesale prices in the RPM game are higher. But if only the 
demand pocket coming with high probability is served in the niche competition game, it can be 
shown that the wholesale price is strictly lower under the RPM game (while the retail prices are 
the same in both games). Thus it is not generally true that the MAP programs lead to higher 
wholesale prices. This is somewhat against the common intuition. But we have to refrain from 
that intuition because it overlooks the strategic interactions among the manufacturers and retailers 
in a new market mechanism. 
People may be concerned about the fact that the consumers have to pay higher prices under 
the MAP programs. While this is likely to be the case, they may neglect the important effect of 
the MAP programs on the quantity of sale. The judgment on the MAP programs would be fairer if 
we notice that the MAP programs may facilitate greater expected sales to the consumers and thus 
result in higher consumer surplus. As a music dealer Joan C. Bradley from Northeast One Stop, 
Inc. argued,  
 
“… They (mass merchants) also discriminate against all music except the top sellers. When 
less than top sellers stop being sold, future generations will be deprived of new music and older 
                                                 
9 In the music CD industry, the distributors usually buy back the unsold copies from the retailers. 
This violates an assumption of this paper. However, our model still applies as long as the retailers 
have to incur some notable costs for unsold CDs, for example, costs associated with organizing, 
displaying and shipping.   24
generations will be deprived of catalog product (including classical, jazz and their favorite tunes) 
not carried by the mass merchants and not promoted with loss-leader prices.”
10  
 
The “mass merchants” refer to the discount stores. They charge relatively low retail prices for the 
music titles and cover their costs by selling quickly. Those discount stores cannot profitably deal 
the catalog products at low prices because the sales of those items are slow and uncertain. The 
catalog items have to be sold at high prices under the niche competition, because the retailers 
have to confront the costs associated with unsold copies. But the high prices may suffocate the 
demand and destroy the business. The retailers under the MAP programs are able to carry the 
catalog products because the margins from sales are guaranteed.  
The MAP programs are likely to improve the social welfare in the prerecorded music market 
because they encourage the retailers to stock greater inventories and serve more consumers. To 
estimate its effect on the consumer surplus, it is important to observe whether those programs can 
stimulate significantly higher wholesale demand for inventories from the retailers. The MAP 
programs are beneficial to the consumers if considerably greater wholesale demand is observed. It 
may not be adequate to consider the effects of the MAP programs on the prices only, which could 
be misleading in an oligopoly with demand uncertainty.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
This paper tries to extend t he results found by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck [1996] to a 
market where the manufacturers face competition from rivals. One might conjecture that the 
competition by manufacturers may take away the advantages of RPM, because the competition 
tends to drive the prices down and thus may discourage the manufacturers from imposing RPM. 
But this paper shows that may not be the case. The manufacturers still have incentive to impose 
                                                 
10 Public comments to FTC file No. 971 0070 (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/index.htm).   25
RPM even after the competition by manufacturers is taken into consideration. RPM can also 
preclude the possible coordination failure among the manufacturers, which means RPM can 
ensure a better market condition for the manufacturers. 
RPM can enhance the social welfare by encouraging the retailers to stock greater inventories 
and thus facilitating greater expected sales to the consumers. Though the economy as a whole can 
benefit from it, the consumers can be strictly worse off with RPM. Only when the efficiency gain 
is significant, RPM can make not only the manufacturers but also the consumers better off. It is 
interesting to see that RPM is able to rule out the possible coordination failure among the 
manufacturers, which makes the market outcome more certain and preferable from the 
perspective of the manufacturers who face competition and demand uncertainty. 
One might also think that the competition by manufacturers should have very complicated 
interactions in the niche competition game, since there are many different retail prices prevailing 
in the market and the interaction among the retailers could be exceptionally complex. But this 
paper shows that it could be analyzed tractably. Part of the reason is that even with oligopolistic 
manufacturers (and competitive retailers), the entire set of retail prices of each manufacturer’s 
product is s till solely determined by the manufacturer’s wholesale price, though the retail 
inventories are now determined by both manufacturers’ wholesale prices. With similar 
methodology, we may be able to study the effect of RPM on some other types of wholesale 
markets, for example, a market with monopolistically competitive manufacturers. 
 
Appendix 
Following are the proofs of Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 of Section III about 
the niche competition game.  
If  q t 2 < , the following price ranges need to be considered separately in order to locate the 
equilibrium of the game. Note each price range is either an open interval or a point.   26
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w w - - ˛ . This is akin to the “typical oligopoly”. 








w w - - = = . This is akin to the “restricted oligopoly”. 








w w - - - ˛ . Demand pocket 1 is fully served. Pocket 2 is partially served.  




0 . This is the boundary situation of C and E. 
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w w - = = . “Restricted oligopoly” in demand pocket 1. Pocket 2 is not served. 








w w - ˛ . Demand pocket 1 is partially served and pocket 2 is not served. 
If  q t 2 ‡ , the price ranges that need to be considered separately are 
A’, B’. (Same as A or B). 
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w w - = = . “Restricted oligopoly” in demand pocket 1. Pocket 2 is partially served. 








w w - - ˛ . Both demand pockets are partially served. 




0 . This is the boundary situation of E’ and G’. 




0 q w w - ˛ . Demand pocket 1 is partially served. Pocket 2 is not served. 
Fortunately, not all these situations can happen in equilibrium. Lemma 3.3 claims the 
situations that can occur in equilibrium are A (A’), B (B’) and E. Situation A, B and E leads to 
type I, II and III equilibrium respectively. It is easy to see situations F, G, F’ 
happen: same to the “typical oligopoly” of Section II, when the manufacturers just compete in   27
one demand pocket and 
3
2
< t , the equilibrium wholesale price is  t and the whole demand 
pocket 1 is served. Two claims are presented at the end of this appendix. Claim 1 precludes 
situations C, C’, D’ and E’. Claim 2 precludes situation D. Lemma 3.3 is reached automatically 
after all the propositions and claims are proven.  
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are a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if 
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Proof: Suppose the manufacturers’ wholesale prices satisfy  )) 1 )(
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0 p p . A necessary condition for (A1) 
to be the equilibrium can be obtained by observing  )) 1 )(
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.                                  (A4) 
To ensure prices (A1) are really the equilibrium of the game, we need to guarantee that 
neither manufacturer has incentive to deviate from (A1). Without loss of generality, we only 
examine whether manufacturer 1 can profitably deviate. 
First, we see whether manufacturer 1 can profitably deviate to  ] 1 ), 1 )(
2
1 [( 1 q q
t
w - - - ˛ . We 
have two cases to consider. 1.  t w w - > + 2 1
*
0 . The manufacturers do not compete in either 























= p . It can be showed 
that manufacturer 1 cannot do better than that when 
*
0 1 2 w t w - - =  (by checking the first order 
derivative). So we enter the second case. 2.  t w w - £ + 2 1
*
0 . If the manufacturers compete at the 










Now we suppose they compete only in demand pocket 1. Manufacturer 1’s customers from 
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= p . It can be showed that 
manufacturer 1 cannot do better than that when 
*
0 1 ) 1 )( 2 ( w q t w - - - = , which yields a lower 
profit than (A2). Thus manufacturer 1 cannot profitably deviate to  ] 1 ), 1 )(
2
1 [( 1 q q
t
w - - - ˛ . 
Second, we see if manufacturer 1 wishes to deviate to  q w - >1 1  and serve demand pocket 1 
only. Again we have two cases: 1. If  t w w - > + 2 1
*
0 , the manufacturers do not compete even in 
demand pocket 1. It can be showed that manufacturer 1’s profit is always lower than that when 
*
0 1 2 w t w - - = . So we enter the second case. 2. If  t w w - £ + 2 1
*
0  Manufacturer 1’s profit 
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Summing up, prices (A1) are the equilibrium wholesale prices of the game if and only if (A4) and 
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w w - - = = . At those wholesale prices, the profits of the 
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it can be showed that manufacturer 1 cannot do better than that when  ) 1 )(
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the condition for manufacturer 1 not to deviate to  ) 1 )(
2
1 ( 1 q
t
w - - <  is (A9). 
Second, consider deviation to  ] 1 ), 1 )(
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1 (( 1 q q
t
w - - - ˛ , which implies demand pocket 2 is 
served in partial. We have two cases: 1. If  t w w - > + 2 1
*
0 , the manufacturers do not compete 























= p . It can 
be showed that manufacturer 1 cannot do better than that when 
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0 1 2 w t w - - = . So we enter the 
second case. 2. If  t w w - £ + 2 1
*
0 , the manufacturers compete in and only in demand pocket 1. 
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manufacturer 1 cannot do better than that when  ) 1 )(
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w - - = . Hence deviating to 
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2
1 (( 1 q q
t
w - - - ˛  cannot possibly be an advantage. 
Third, consider deviation to the range of  q w - >1 1 , which implies manufacturer 1 now 
serves demand pocket 1 only. Consider two cases: 1. If  t w w - > + 2 1
*
0 , the manufacturers do 
not compete even in demand pocket 1. It can be showed that manufacturer 1 cannot do better than 
that when 
*
0 1 2 w t w - - = . So we enter the second case. 2. If  t w w - £ + 2 1
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.                                                (A11) 
Summing up, the conditions for (A7) to be the equilibrium wholesale prices of the game are 
















.  Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3.6 In the niche competition game, the prices  
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are a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if 
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Proof: Suppose  )
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q w w - - ˛ . Only demand pocket 1 is served. The manufacturers’ 
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w - ‡ , 
or  q w - =1 1 . The proofs are the same as that with vertical integrated manufacturers. Now we 
check if one of the manufacturers, say 1, has incentive to deviate to  t q w < - <1 1  and serve both 
demand pockets. Given  t w =
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1 w  as manufacturer 1’s optimal price below  q - 1 . We have two possible cases:  
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This is not greater than the original profit 
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 conflicts with the condition  q t - >1 . Thus for (A12) 
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One can check that condition  q t q 2 1 < < -  is satisfied in (d) and (e). Thus they are the sufficient 
and necessary conditions for (A12) to be the equilibrium prices of the game. Q.E.D. 
 
Claim 1: In the niche competition game, the equilibrium wholesale prices cannot possibly 
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Proof: Suppose wholesale prices  ) 1 ), 1 )(
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t
w w - - - ˛ . Consider three cases. 1. If 
t w w - £ + 2 1 0 , the manufacturers compete in and only in demand pocket 1. Manufacturer 1’s 

































whenever  t w w - £ + 2 1 0  and  ) 1 ), 1 )(
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1 (( , 1 0 q q
t
w w - - - ˛ . So this case cannot contain an 
equilibrium. 2. If t w w - > + 2 1 0 , the manufacturers do not compete even in demand pocket 1.   36






















































t , which is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to have equilibrium prices 








w w - - - ˛ . Q.E.D. 
 









0 , only demand pocket 1 is served. The 
equilibrium wholesale prices would be t if only demand pocket 1 is served (Proposition 3.6). 




0  is not an equilibrium when  q t - „1 . If  q t - =1 , it can be showed that 
lowering the price from  q - 1  and thus serving demand pocket 2 enables a manufacturer to earn 
more profit (the opportunity to serve demand pocket 2 destroys the first order conditions at t). 




0  cannot be an equilibrium of the game. Q.E.D. 
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